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Office (Tax Office) to extend our understanding of how and why cooperation and 
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policy focused research and discussion papers; and (3) to give ready access to previews of 
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Abstract 
 
This study investigated whether tax ethics and social norms constitute true motivations for 
tax compliance, or whether they are mere rationalisations of self-interested behaviour. 
Cross-lagged panel analyses were applied to data from a two-wave survey with 1161 
Australian citizens. First, results showed that tax ethics causally affected tax compliance 
and were affected by levels of compliance. Second, perceived social norms causally 
affected personally held tax ethics, but only for respondents who identified strongly with 
the respective group. At the same time, personal ethics were also projected onto the 
perceived normative beliefs of the social group. Third, perceived norms causally affected 
tax compliance, partly mediated by their effect on personal ethics. Conversely, tax 
compliance also affected the perception of norms. Overall, the study provides evidence for 
a complex role of individual ethics and social norms in taxpaying behaviour. 
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Motivation or rationalisation? Causal relations between ethics, norms and tax 
compliance 
 
Michael Wenzel1 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The dominant view in research and practice of tax administration is that tax compliance is 
largely a function of taxpayers’ rational pursuit of their self-interests. From this 
perspective, taxes are costs for taxpayers that they try to avoid or reduce. Taxpayers are 
thus likely to evade tax unless the probability that their evasion is detected and the severity 
of the expected penalties render tax evasion an unattractive option. Therefore, it is assumed 
deterrence is the only means of generating compliance (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972, 
Cowell, 1985; see Andreoni, Erard, & Feinstein, 1998). However, this self-interest 
perspective to tax compliance has been criticised as being too narrow. Given the actual low 
rates of audit and rather mild penalties, it has been argued that deterrence cannot account 
for the generally high level of compliance (Alm, McClelland, & Schulze, 1992). More 
social motivations rather than mere selfishness, it is assumed, affect taxpaying behaviour, 
such as ethical concerns and social norms, perceptions of fairness and legitimacy (James, 
Hasseldine, Hite, & Toumi, 2001; see Tyler, 1990). Rather than just being extrinsically 
motivated by material incentives, intrinsic motivations largely determine tax compliance 
(see Carroll, 1987). 
 
There is indeed empirical evidence suggesting that tax ethics – defined here as one’s belief 
that there is a moral imperative that one should be honest in one’s tax dealings – are related 
to taxpaying behaviour. However, most of the evidence stems from survey studies and is 
only of correlational nature (for example, Grasmick & Bursick, 1990; Reckers, Sanders, & 
Roark, 1994; Sheffrin & Triest, 1992). It is therefore not clear from these studies whether 
tax ethics do causally affect taxpaying decisions, or whether they are mere justifications 
and neutralisations for otherwise self-interested, extrinsically motivated behaviour (see 
Thurman, St. John, & Riggs, 1984). The same is true for social norms which have usually 
been studied as the perceived prevalence or acceptance of tax evasion among a reference 
group (for example, DeJuan, Lasheras, & Mayo, 1994; Porcano, 1988; Webley, Cole, & 
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Eidjar, 2001); or as naturally varying between different cultural or subcultural groups (for 
example, Alm, Sanchez, & DeJuan, 1995). In either case, the evidence is only of a 
correlational nature and we do not know whether social norms causally affect one’s 
taxpaying behaviour or whether social norms are constructed so as to explain and justify 
the behaviour. 
 
Of course, a methodology that would yield clearer evidence for the causal relation between 
tax ethics and compliance is the experimental approach. However, tax ethics and social 
norms are not easily manipulated experimentally. Laboratory experiments that provided 
evidence for the role of ethics often used rather indirect manipulations; their implications 
for ethical concerns are more presumed than evident (for example, Alm, McClelland, & 
Schulze, 1999; Bosco & Mittone, 1997). In contrast, in a field-experimental study, 
Schwartz and Orleans (1967) used an implicit appeal to taxpayers’ conscience and indeed 
found some effects on tax-reporting behaviour compared to control groups. Similarly, 
based on the assumption that perceived widespread acceptance of tax cheating (that is, the 
social norm) could affect one’s own tax compliance, I conducted a field-experiment that 
attempted to counteract or correct such a misperception of the norm (Wenzel, 2001a). The 
intervention was indeed successful in reducing actual deduction claims and thus 
presumably increasing compliance (see also Blumenthal, Christian, & Slemrod, 2001; 
Coleman, 1997). However, the exact process and the causal mediating role of tax ethics 
could only be inferred, with some help from a questionnaire-based prestudy (Wenzel, 
2001b). Also, experiments usually focus on one causal direction, but even supportive 
evidence does not rule out that the reverse causality can also be true. 
 
The present study addresses the question of the causal role of tax ethics and social norms in 
taxpaying behaviour by adopting a different methodological approach; namely cross-
lagged panel designs for longitudinal data (Kenny, 1979; Plewis, 1985). Cross-lagged 
designs require measurement of the same concepts at two different points in time. The 
presumed criterion variable measured at Time 2 is regressed onto the presumed predictor 
variable at Time 1, while controlling for Time 1 variation in the criterion variable. This 
way, it is estimated whether the predictor significantly explains change in the criterion 
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variable from Time 1 to Time 2. Such an effect, it is assumed, indicates that the predictor 
causally affects the criterion variable (because the predictor precedes the change).  
 
In this research, personal tax ethics and perceived social norms both refer to injunctive 
norms (Cialdini, Kallgren, & Reno, 1991), that is normative prescriptions regarding tax 
compliance or, conversely, the normative acceptability of noncompliance. While tax ethics 
refer to respondents’ own personal beliefs about the normative appropriateness of tax 
compliance or noncompliance, social norms refer to their perceptions of what most other 
people believe is appropriate.  
 
2. Ethics, norms and compliance 
 
What is the causal role of tax ethics in taxpaying behaviour? Are ethics a causal 
determinant of compliance, or are they mere rationalisations for otherwise self-interested 
behaviour? And what about perceived social norms? Do they, internalised by taxpayers, 
causally affect their own tax ethics, or do taxpayers merely project their own views onto 
other people and construe social norms to support their own views? Moreover, do social 
norms affect tax compliance through a process of internalisation, or are they again 
construed so as to rationalise tax evasion after the fact?  
 
These questions contrast the view of taxpayers as profit-maximising rational actors with 
the alternative view of taxpayers as moral/social actors. We will derive from these two 
perspectives a set of contrasting hypotheses. However, it should be noted that the differing 
causalities predicted in the alternative hypotheses are not mutually exclusive. Both causal 
directions can coexist, and each will be tested independently from the other. 
 
First, it is clear that the moral/social actor perspective assumes that taxpayers base their 
taxpaying decisions on their moral and ethical beliefs: 
 
H1 (a) Taxpayer ethics have a causal impact on tax compliance. 
 
In contrast, from a rational actor perspective, it could be argued that the maximisation of 
self-interest is the primary motivation for tax evasion and that ethical views are only 
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brought in line with one’s behaviour after the fact, in order to rationalise and justify it, or – 
which would add a more social dimension to this view – in order to maintain cognitive 
consistency (Festinger, 1957). That is,  
 
H1 (b) Tax compliance has a causal impact on tax ethics. 
 
If tax ethics have a causal effect on taxpaying behaviour, what is the position of the 
moral/social actor perspective on where these ethical views come from? Rather than being 
a construction of the individual mind (serving individual interests), the moral/social actor 
view assumes that ethics are largely a social product. They are based on the social norms 
of relevant reference groups. More specifically, it can be argued that, in a given context, 
people categorise themselves through a process of identification as a member of a social 
group, which they regard then as a relevant reference group whose prototypical views they 
regard as valid norms in the situation (Turner, 1991; Wenzel, 2004). Therefore, taxpayers 
can be expected to adopt the norms of a social group, internalise them and regard them as 
their own ethical views, if or when they identify with that group. 
 
H2 (a) Social norms have a causal impact on tax ethics, when taxpayers identify with the 
social group that is considered to hold the social norms. 
 
In contrast, from an individualist rational actor perspective, it could be argued that 
perceived social norms are largely constructions of the individual to rationalise and support 
their own views. Such causality would correspond to what is known in social psychology 
as social projection or a false consensus effect (Ross, Greene, & House, 1977; see Marks & 
Miller, 1987). Taxpayers may generalise from their own personal views to the views of the 
larger group. The basis of the false consensus effect may be cognitive or motivational. 
People may project their views because they have little insight into the prevalent social 
norms, while they know very well about the ethical views of one exemplar of that group, 
namely themselves. Or, they may actively seek social support for their own views and thus 
be motivated to perceive the social norm as being consistent with their own view (Marks & 
Miller, 1987).  
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In this sense, the predicted causal effect of ethics on norms may not be so asocial after all. 
That is, people may project their own views onto others because they are concerned about 
appearing to be within the norm; and they may specifically seek support of the group with 
which they identify and which they regard as a reference group (Mullen, Dovidio, Johnson, 
& Copper, 1992). Thus, it could be the case that the predicted causal effect of personal 
ethics on social norms is more accentuated when people identify with the respective group. 
 
H2 (b) Personal tax ethics have a causal impact on the perception of social norms, when 
taxpayers identify with the social group to which the social norms are attributed. 
 
Following the logic of the moral/social actor view, social norms should influence 
taxpaying behaviour, when they are internalised through a process of identification with 
the relevant social group (Wenzel, 2004). That is, perceived social norms will causally 
affect tax compliance when taxpayers identify with the group to which the norms are 
attributed. The casual effect will be mediated by the internalisation of social norms through 
which they become part of the taxpayer’s own individual make-up. When the 
internalisation process is accounted for, that is, personal ethics are statistically controlled, 
the effect of social norms should disappear. 
 
H3 (a) (i) Social norms causally affect taxpayers’ compliance levels, when taxpayers 
identify strongly with the relevant social group (and thus internalise the norms).  
(ii) The social norm effect will disappear when personal ethics are statistically controlled 
(thus accounting for the internalisation process). 
 
In contrast, from the rational actor perspective, taxpayers may rationalise their own self-
interested behaviour (noncompliance) by arguing that tax evasion is very common; that 
most people do it or endorse such behaviour to some extent. Therefore, if they evade tax 
they only do what everybody does; if they did otherwise they would carry everybody else’s 
burden and would be taken advantage of (that is, they would be a ‘sucker’, to use the term 
from social dilemma research). 
 
H3 (b) Tax compliance has a causal impact on the perception of social norms.  
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3. Method 
 
3.1 Participants 
 
The data were taken from a longitudinal survey of Australian citizens (Braithwaite, 2000, 
2001). Respondents were first contacted in 2000 and asked to fill in a survey. The self-
completion questionnaire was sent to a sample of 7754 Australian citizens drawn from the 
Australian electoral roll. Subtracting cases where the mail was returned to sender, 
addressees were deceased, and so on - 7003 questionnaires were effectively sent out (for 
procedural details, see Mearns & Braithwaite, 2001). After repeated appeals for 
participation, 2040 respondents, or 29%, returned their questionnaires. Compared to census 
data, the sample proved broadly representative for the Australian population, but, as in 
most surveys, it tended to underrepresent people younger than 35, and to overrepresent 
people between 40 and 65 years of age as well as the better educated (Mearns & 
Braithwaite, 2001). The 2040 respondents were then contacted again in 2001/2002 and 
asked to fill in a follow-up survey. In total, 1161 respondents complied with this request 
and returned a usable questionnaire.  
 
However, the compliance measures at Time 2 referred to the respondent’s most recent tax 
return. For a truly longitudinal design, the financial year that respondents referred to at 
Time 2 should be different and later than the financial year 1998/1999 referred to at Time 
1. Therefore, 125 respondents who indicated at Time 2 that their most recent tax return was 
for the financial year 1998/1999 or earlier were excluded from the analyses. (Respondents 
with missing values for this question, however, were maintained for the analyses). This left 
a sample size of 1036. 
 
Further, it should be noted that 206 respondents did not have valid data on any of the 
taxpaying measures at Time 1, and 183 respondents had no valid data for taxpaying 
measures at Time 2. In total, 299 cases were without valid data on the compliance 
measures for Time 1 or Time 2. To some extent respondents probably had not lodged a tax 
return in recent years (for example, 86 out of the 183 at Time 2 failed to indicate when 
they last lodged a tax return). A large majority of these may not have been required to 
lodge a return or they left it to their partners. However, at Time 2 for instance, 97 cases 
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(11%) out of 864 respondents who positively stated that they had lodged a return either for 
2001/2002 or 2000/2001 did not provide valid answers to tax compliance questions. This 
rate of non-response is higher than for other dependent variables (around 1 to 3%) and 
suggests some reservations to answer openly questions about tax compliance. 
 
The listwise valid n thus varied between analyses, most importantly depending on whether 
compliance measures were included in the analysis or not. The participants in the overall 
valid sample (N = 1036) were between 18 and 88 years old (Mdn = 49); 49% were male, 
51% were female. 
 
3.2 Questionnaire 
 
3.2.1 Tax Compliance 
A number of items with different response formats were used to measure three forms of tax 
noncompliance (see Wenzel, 2002a, 2004). At Time 1, questions referred to the 1998/1999 
tax return; at Time 2, questions referred to respondents’ most recent tax return (which had 
to be 1999/2000 or later to be included in the data analysis). For each form of 
noncompliance, scores were transformed into dichotomous values (0 = compliant, 1 = 
noncompliant); these values were added across the three different forms to receive a total 
score of noncompliance (from 0 to 3). The final measure thus captured a respondent’s self-
reported number of noncompliant taxpaying behaviours (Time 1: M = 0.34; SD = 0.61; 
Time 2: M = 0.28; SD = 0.57). These behaviours were measured as follows: 
 
Pay income. Pay income refers in this paper to income in form of remuneration for work or 
services (Wenzel, 2002a). Two items measured whether or not respondents declared all 
their pay income. If respondents had a score of 0 for all of the following questions, they 
were defined as fully compliant (0); otherwise they were defined as not fully compliant or 
noncompliant (1): ‘As far as you know, did you report all the money you earned in your 
[1998-99; most recent] income tax return?’ (0 = yes, 1 = no); ‘Have you worked for cash-
in-hand payments in the last 12 months? By cash-in-hand we mean cash money that tax is 
not paid on.’ (1 = yes, 2 = no, recoded into 1 and 0, respectively). At Time 1, 69 
respondents (7.6%) indicated not having reported all their pay income; at Time 2, it was 63 
(6.6%). 
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Non-pay income. Five items measured underreporting of non-pay income. ‘People earn 
income from many different sources, […] Think about each of the sources of income listed 
below, and select the response that best describes your [1998-99; most recent] income tax 
return’ (1 = received none, 2 = did not declare it, 3 = declared some, 4 = declared most, 5 
= declared all; recoded into 0, 1, 1, 1, and 0, respectively): (1) Eligible termination 
payments; (2) Australian government allowances like Youth Allowance, Austudy, 
Newstart; (3) Australian government pension, superannuation pensions, and other pensions 
and annuities; (4) Interest; (5) Dividends. If respondents had a score of 0 for all the above 
questions, they were defined as fully reporting their non-pay income and thus were deemed 
to be compliant (0); otherwise they were defined as not fully compliant or noncompliant 
(1). At Time 1, 58 respondents (6.7%) and, at Time 2, 50 respondents (5.7%) reported they 
had not declared all their non-pay income. 
 
Deductions. Two questions addressed respondents’ deduction claims: ‘As far as you know, 
did you exaggerate the amount of deductions or rebates in your [1998-99; most recent] 
income tax return?’ (1 = a lot, 2 = quite a bit, 3 = somewhat, 4 = a little, 5 = not at all; 
recoded into 1, 1, 1, 1, and 0, respectively); ‘Think of the deductions and rebates you 
claimed in your [1998-99; most recent] income tax return. Would you say you were …’ (1 
= …absolutely confident that they were all legitimate, 2 = a bit unsure about some of them, 
3 = pretty unsure about quite a lot, 4 = haven’t a clue, someone else did it; recoded into 0, 
1, 1, and 1, respectively). If respondents had a score of 0 for both questions, they were 
defined as fully compliant (0); otherwise they were coded as not fully compliant or 
noncompliant (1). At Time 1, 168 respondents (18.7%) reported exaggerated deduction 
claims; at Time 2, it was 150 (16.0%) respondents. 
 
3.2.2 Identification 
At Time 1, two ratings measured identification with Australians, which should 
approximate the group to which the perceived social norms (see below) might be 
attributed: ‘Being a member of the Australian community is important to me’, and ‘I feel a 
sense of pride in being a member of the Australian community’ (1 = do not agree at all, 7 
= agree completely). The items were highly correlated (r = 0.84) and scores were averaged 
to obtain a measure of social identification. It should be noted that the measure was clearly 
 9
skewed towards a high level of identification (M = 5.90; SD = 1.15), and thus mainly 
differentiated between more or less highly identified respondents. 
 
3.2.3 Norms 
Social norm. The social norm referred to the perceived injunctive norms of ‘most people’ 
and were measured by three items using five-point scales (1 = no!!, 5 = yes!!): ‘Do MOST 
PEOPLE think they should honestly declare cash earnings on their tax return?’; ‘Do 
MOST PEOPLE think it is acceptable to overstate tax deductions on their tax return?’ 
(reverse-coded); and ‘Do MOST PEOPLE think working for cash-in-hand payments 
without paying tax is a trivial offence?’ (reverse-coded). The items showed rather low, but 
acceptable internal consistencies (Time 1:  = 0.56; Time 2:  = 0.60). Scores were 
averaged to obtain a measure of the social norm (Time 1: M = 2.57, SD = 0.69; Time 2: M 
= 2.58, SD = 0.76). 
 
Personal norm. The personal norm referred to one’s own injunctive norms concerning 
taxpaying and were measured by equivalent three items (1 = no!!, 5 = yes!!): ‘Do YOU 
think you should honestly declare cash earnings on your tax return?’; ‘Do YOU think it is 
acceptable to overstate tax deductions on your tax return?’ (reverse-coded); and ‘Do YOU 
think working for cash-in-hand payments without paying tax is a trivial offence?’ (reverse-
coded). Again, the items showed rather low, but sufficient, internal consistencies (Time 1: 
 = 0.56; Time 2:  = 0.55), and scores were averaged to obtain measures of the personal 
norm (Time 1: M = 3.70, SD = 0.73; Time 2: M = 3.72, SD = 0.71). 
 
3.2.4 Background variables 
Respondents were asked to indicate their age, sex (0 = male, 1 = female), family income 
(from none, 5, 10, 15, … to 75, 100, 250+ thousand dollars), education level (1 = no 
formal schooling, to 8 = post-graduate degree), country of birth (coded as 0 = other than 
Australia, 1 = Australia), and whether or not they used services of a tax agent for their tax 
returns (0 = no, 1 = yes). These control variables were all used as recorded at Time 1.  
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4. Results 
 
All hypotheses were tested by multiple regression analyses. Each cross-lagged panel 
involves a regression of the designated criterion variable at Time 2 on itself at Time 1 and 
the predictor variable of interest at Time 1. A number of background characteristics were 
also controlled (sex, age, family income, education level, country of birth and tax agent 
use) in order to exclude as much as possible the eventuality that the relationship between 
predictor and criterion variables is only due to their shared relationship with a third 
variable and thus not a causal relationship. Of course, as with any regression analysis, there 
is the problem of omitted variables. We can only measure and include in our analyses a 
limited number of control variables, and there is a risk that a variable has been omitted that 
can account for (part of) the shared variation between the predictor variable at Time 1 and 
change in the criterion variable. For descriptive statistics and correlations see Table 1. 
 
4.1 Personal ethics and compliance 
 
The first set of hypotheses was tested by (a) regressing self-reported tax compliance at 
Time 2 on personal tax ethics at Time 1 (while controlling for Time 1 tax compliance and 
all control variables), and (b) regressing personal tax ethics at Time 2 on self-reported 
compliance at Time 1 (while controlling for Time 1 tax ethics and all control variables). 
The results are displayed in Table 2. Next to some effects of control variables, which will 
not be discussed in detail here, there were substantive auto-regression effects in either case, 
indicating that tax compliance as well as tax ethics were moderately stable over time. 
Further, consistent with Hypothesis 1a, Time 1 tax ethics were significantly negatively 
related to Time 2 tax evasion, suggesting that personal morals do causally affect taxpaying 
behaviour. However, at the same time, there was also a significant effect of tax 
noncompliance at Time 1 on tax ethics at Time 2, consistent with Hypothesis 1b. It seems 
that tax ethics are also causally affected by, and thus used to rationalise, taxpaying 
behaviour. 
 
Hence, there is empirical evidence for both processes. Tax ethics have a significant effect 
on tax compliance in line with a true ethical motivation; and tax compliance has a 
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significant effect on tax ethics, consistent with a rationalisation effect or attempt to 
maintain cognitive consistency. 
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics and correlations 
Variable M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Sex 1.51 0.50 —             
2. Age 49.16 14.68 -0.14*** —            
3. Family income 52.05 37.40 -0.06† -0.10** —           
4. Education 4.84 1.76 -0.09** -0.20*** 0.29*** —          
5. Country of birth 0.78 0.42 -0.03 -0.16*** 0.06† -0.04 —         
6. Tax agent 1.28 0.45 -0.05† -0.06* -0.11*** 0.00 -0.05 —        
7. Identification 5.90 1.15 -0.01 0.16*** -0.01 -0.11*** 0.06† -0.05† —       
8. Tax ethics 1 3.70 0.73 -0.06† 00.20*** 0.08* 0.08** -0.02 0.03 0.06* —      
9. Social norms 1 2.57 0.69 -0.10** 00.12*** -0.12*** -0.07* -0.12*** 0.03 0.01 0.08* —     
10. Tax noncomp. 1 0.34 0.61 -0.05 -0.14*** -0.00 0.08* -0.04 0.03 -0.10** -0.32*** -0.06 —    
11. Tax ethics 2 3.72 0.71 -0.02 00.17*** 0.09** 0.06† 0.00 0.06 0.06† 0.51*** 0.04 -0.25*** —   
12. Social norms 2 2.58 0.76 -0.01 00.06* 0.00 -0.04 -0.07* -0.00 0.07* 0.11*** 0.41*** -0.08* 0.17*** —  
13. Tax noncomp. 2 0.28 0.57 -0.10** -0.15*** -0.03 0.03 -0.05 0.05 -0.08* -0.25*** -0.03 0.44*** -0.27*** -0.06† — 
 
Note. Tax noncomp. = Tax noncompliance. †p < 0.10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
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Table 2: Cross-lagged regressions between self-reported tax noncompliance and 
personal tax ethics 
 
  Dependent variable:  
Tax noncompliance 2 
 Dependent variable:  
Tax ethics 2 
Predictors         
Sex   -0.10**    -0.01  
Age   -0.09*    0.06†  
Family income   -0.01    0.06†  
Education   -0.01    0.02  
Country of birth   -0.05    0.02  
Tax agent   0.00    -0.07*  
         
Tax noncompliance 1   0.40***    -0.11***  
Tax ethics 1   -0.10*    0.45***  
         
   R2 = 0.23   R2 = 0.29 
   F = 25.20***   F = 37.42*** 
   df = 8; 678   df = 8; 744 
 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
4.2 Personal ethics and social norms 
 
The second set of hypotheses was tested by hierarchical regression analyses where 
interaction terms involving identification were included in a second step. In a first step (a) 
personal tax ethics at Time 2 were regressed on social norms at Time 1 (while controlling 
for Time 1 tax ethics, identification and all control variables), and (b) social norms at Time 
2 were regressed on personal tax ethics at Time 1 (while controlling for Time 1 social 
norms, identification and all control variables). In a second step, the interaction terms of 
(a) social norms and identification and (b) tax ethics and identification were included, 
respectively. Note that all variables were first standardised and interaction terms were 
based on the product of the respective standardised variables. The unstandardised solution 
yielded the appropriate standardised coefficients, while the constants could be non-zero 
(Aiken & West, 1991).  
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Table 3: Cross-lagged regressions between personal tax ethics and perceived social 
norms 
 
  Dependent variable:  
Tax ethics 2 
 Dependent variable:  
Social norms 2 
Predictors  Step 1 () Step 2 ()  Step 1 () Step 2 () 
Sex  0.02 0.02  0.04 0.04 
Age  0.09** 0.10**  -0.03 -0.03 
Income  0.08* 0.08*  0.02 0.02 
Education  -0.00 -0.00  0.01 0.01 
Country of birth  0.01 0.01  0.00 0.01 
Tax agent  -0.07* -0.07*  0.02 0.02 
       
Tax ethics 1  0.50*** 0.50***  0.08* 0.08* 
Social norms 1  0.02 0.01  0.44*** 0.44***
Identification  0.05 0.05†  0.05 0.05 
       
Social norms X Identification  — 0.06†  — — 
Tax ethics X Identification  — —  — 0.03 
       
Constant  0.00 0.00  -0.00 -0.00 
     
∆R2  0.30 0.00  0.20 0.00 
∆F  41.55*** 3.79†  23.90*** 1.57 
df   9; 867  1; 866   9; 869  1; 868 
 
†p < .10, *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. 
 
The results are displayed in Table 3. There were some effects of control variables, but only 
so for tax ethics as the criterion. Again, there were substantive auto-regression effects in 
both regression models, indicating that tax ethics and social norms were moderately stable 
over time. Further, while there was no main effect of Time 1 social norms on Time 2 tax 
ethics, consistent with Hypothesis 2a, social norms and identification interacted in their 
effects on tax ethics (the interaction was close to significant, p = 0.052). Simple slope 
analyses for –1 and +1 standard deviation of identification (Aiken & West, 1991) showed 
that social norms did not affect tax ethics when identification was low ( = -0.04, ns), but 
social norms did have a marginally significant effect when identification was strong ( = 
0.07, p = 0.072; see Fig. 1).  
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Figure 1: Simple slopes for the effects of social norms on personal tax ethics at low 
versus high levels of identification 
 
Conversely, for the regression of Time 2 social norms on tax ethics, the interaction effect 
was not significant, however the main effect of tax ethics was. Tax ethics at Time 1 
seemed to causally affect the perception of social norms, consistent with Hypothesis 2b. 
However, unexpectedly, this was not moderated by level of identification. Thus, personally 
held tax ethics seemed to be projected onto the social group.  
 
4.3 Tax Compliance and Social Norms 
 
The third set of hypotheses was tested in two stages. Hypothesis 3a first required a test for 
the interaction effect between identification and social norms on tax evasion, introduced at 
the second step of a hierarchical regression. Second, if a significant effect of social norms 
were found, it needed to be tested whether these were mediated by personal tax ethics, 
which were thus introduced at the second step of a follow-up regression model. While 
Hypothesis 3b did not make such a complex prediction, for the sake of completeness the 
same sequence of analyses was used for Time 2 social norms as criterion variable.  
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First, two hierarchical regression analyses were conducted where (a) tax evasion at Time 2 
was regressed on social norms at Time 1 (while controlling for Time 1 tax evasion, 
identification and all control variables), and the interaction between identification and 
social norms in the second step; and (b) social norms at Time 2 were regressed on tax 
evasion at Time 1 (while controlling for Time 1 social norms, identification and all control 
variables), and the interaction between tax noncompliance and identification in the second 
step. The results are shown in Table 4. 
 
Table 4: Cross-lagged hierarchical regressions between self-reported tax non-
compliance and social norms, including the interaction between social norms and 
identification at Step 2 
 
  Dependent variable: 
Tax noncompliance 2 
 Dependent variable:  
Social norms 2 
Predictors  Step 1 () Step 2 ()  Step 1 () Step 2 () 
Sex  -0.11** -0.11**  0.02 0.02 
Age  -0.10** 0.10**  -0.03 -0.03 
Income  -0.03 -0.03  0.02 0.02 
Education  -0.02 -0.01  0.03 0.02 
Country of birth  -0.05 -0.05  0.00 0.00 
Tax agent  0.01 0.01  0.03 0.03 
       
Tax noncompliance 1  0.43*** 0.43***  -0.08* -0.08* 
Social norms 1  -0.08* -0.08*  0.42*** 0.42*** 
Identification  -0.00 0.00  0.04 0.04 
       
Social norms X Identification  — -0.03  — — 
Tax noncomp. X Identification  — —  — 0.03 
       
Constant  0.00 -0.00  0.00 0.00 
     
∆R2  0.23 0.00  0.18 0.00 
∆F  21.64*** 0.56  18.08*** 0.57 
df   9; 670  1; 669   9; 737  1; 736 
 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001 
 
As in the earlier analysis involving tax compliance as dependent variable, there were some 
effects of control variables, while there were none for social norms as the criterion 
variable. Also, tax compliance and perceived social norms showed again moderate stability 
over time. More importantly, Time 1 social norms significantly affected Time 2 tax 
evasion. While this effect was consistent with Hypothesis 3a, the effect was unexpectedly 
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not further moderated by identification. Thus, strong social norms in favour of tax honesty 
seemed to encourage taxpayers to be more compliant in their tax returns. 
 
As for Time 2 social norms as dependent variable, the interaction between tax compliance 
and identification was not significant. Rather, consistent with Hypothesis 3b, Time 1 tax 
evasion had a significant negative effect on perceived social norms. This indicates that 
social norm perceptions are also used after the fact to rationalise one’s taxpaying 
behaviour. 
 
Second, two hierarchical regression analyses tested whether the effects of social norms and 
tax evasion, respectively, were mediated by personal tax ethics. Time 2 tax ethics were 
thus introduced in a second step. If they had significant effects and their inclusion reduced 
the earlier effects, this would indicate that they mediated the effects. The results are shown 
in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Cross-lagged hierarchical regressions between self-reported tax non-
compliance and social norms, including personal tax ethics as potential mediator at 
Step 2 
 
  Dependent variable:  
Tax noncompliance 2 
 Dependent variable:  
Social norms 2 
Predictors  Step 1 () Step 2 ()  Step 1 () Step 2 () 
Sex  -0.11** -0.11**  0.01 0.01 
Age  -0.11** -0.07*  -0.04 -0.06 
Income  -0.03 -0.01  0.03 0.02 
Education  -0.02 -0.01  0.02 0.01 
Country of birth  -0.05 -0.05  -0.01 -0.01 
Tax agent  0.01 -0.01  0.03 0.04 
       
Tax noncompliance 1  0.42*** 0.38***  -0.08* -0.04 
Social norms 1  -0.07* -0.06†  0.41*** 0.40***
       
Tax ethics 2  — -0.20***  — 0.17***
       
∆R2  0.23 0.03  0.18 0.03 
∆F  24.60*** 31.11***  19.75*** 23.92***
df   8; 677  1; 676   8; 744  1; 743 
 
Note. Equivalent results are obtained if Tax ethics 1 is used as a mediating variable in Step 3. 
†p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. 
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Indeed, personal tax ethics were significantly related to social norms and tax evasion. 
Further, the inclusion of tax ethics in the models meant that the effect of Time 1 social 
norms on Time 2 tax compliance was somewhat reduced (even though it was still 
marginally significant). Likewise, the effect of Time 1 tax evasion on Time 2 social norms 
was also reduced (to the degree that it was no longer significant). 
 
To sum up, social norms seem to causally affect taxpaying behaviour, at least partly 
mediated by their internalisation as personal tax ethics. However, the moderation of this 
effect by identification did not receive further support. Conversely, social norms also seem 
to be affected by taxpaying behaviour, suggesting that norms are construed in order to 
rationalise one’s behavioural choices. Again, there was evidence that this effect was 
mediated by personal tax ethics. It would appear that, first, taxpayers bring their own tax 
ethics in line with their taxpaying behaviour, to justify and rationalise it or reduce 
cognitive inconsistency. Then, they generalise and project these personal ethics to other 
people, presumably for the sake of further rationalisation and the construction of social 
support.  
 
5. Discussion 
 
Tax compliance research has been largely dominated by the economic rational actor view 
that taxpayers seek to maximise their individual benefit and thus try to evade tax where the 
threat of sanctions does not outweigh the benefits of evasion. They thus rationally, and 
without concerns for right and wrong, choose the option that promises greatest profits. This 
perspective has been challenged by the view that taxpayers are concerned about what they 
(and/or others) consider is right and wrong. According to this perspective, taxpayers act on 
the basis of their moral and ethical beliefs and are influenced by social consensus about the 
ethicality or acceptability of tax evasion. However, the rational actor counter-argument 
could be that personal ethics and perceptions of social norms are only post-hoc 
constructions to rationalise and neutralise behaviour that is essentially driven by profit-
seeking. 
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The present study tried to shed light on the causal role of ethics and norms in taxpaying 
behaviour by employing cross-lagged panel analyses for data from a two-wave survey. On 
the whole, the study provides evidence for both perspectives. Ethics and social norms do 
affect tax compliance, and they are affected by tax compliance. On the one hand, ethical 
concerns seem to be based on the internalised social norms of one’s reference group, and 
tax ethics motivate taxpaying behaviour. On the other hand, ethical concerns as well as 
perceptions of social norms are influenced by one’s engagement in tax evasion. Personal 
ethics, it seems, are made consistent with one’s taxpaying behaviour to rationalise and 
justify it on moral grounds. Likewise, perceptions of social norms not only affect 
taxpaying behaviour, but are also construed so as to be consistent with one’s behaviour and 
ethics, in order to rationalise and claim social support for these.  
 
The study yielded some evidence that social norms are internalised as personal ethics only 
when people identify with the group to which the norms are attributed; and statistically 
controlling for personal ethics reduced the effect of social norms on tax compliance 
(Wenzel, 2004). However, social norm effects on compliance seemed to be only partly 
mediated by their internalisation as personal norms. In fact, it could be the case that the 
perception of social norms as being permissive of tax evasion also affects a rational cost-
benefit analysis underlying one’s taxpaying choice, which is independent from 
identification with the group. That is, perceiving others as accepting tax evasion (and thus 
as probably engaging in tax evasion), taxpayers may conclude that their own taxes would 
be badly invested; that they would be the few who pay for goods and services shared by 
many. They may also conclude that the risk of detection is rather low, or that others would 
not react negatively or sanction them informally if their evasion were found out (Wenzel, 
2002b). Thus, social norms in themselves may give rise to ethical as well as rational 
considerations.  
 
On the other hand, the data also indicated that the causal effect of taxpaying behaviour on 
social norms was also mediated by personal taxpaying ethics. Thus, it seems social norms 
are not directly construed in a way to rationalise tax evasion, as, for instance, in a tit-for-tat 
argument. Rather, taxpayers seem to adjust their own beliefs so as to justify their behaviour 
as right and ethical. They then generalise these views to others, presumably to gain further 
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social support. Thus, the rationalisation of tax evasion or compliance refers first and 
foremost to moral concerns, rather than social exchange considerations. As it seems, even 
the rational actor cannot live or act without concerns for ethics, even if they come after the 
fact.  
 
These results thus seem to indicate, in a more sophisticated way, that the rational and the 
moral/social actor perspectives overlap and are interrelated. This is consistent with the 
dominant finding of the present study, namely that both causal directions of the 
relationship between ethics/norms and compliance found empirical support. Rational and 
social/moral actor perspectives thus do not seem to be mutually exclusive; neither is 
sufficient to explain taxpaying behaviour. Rather, there is evidence for a bi-directional 
causality between ethics/norms and compliance, with ethics being as much a true 
motivation to comply or not comply with the laws as they are a post-hoc construction to 
rationalise and justify compliant or non-compliant behaviour. These results thus call for 
approaches to tax compliance that integrate the rational actor and the social/moral actor 
perspectives (Cullis & Lewis, 1997). 
 
While the present findings seem to suggest a positive feedback loop as it were, with greater 
compliance leading to more ethical beliefs and more ethical beliefs leading to more 
compliance, there is reason to caution against the conclusion that deterrence and appeals to 
ethics cannot interfere negatively with each other. A heavy-handed deterrence approach 
applied to taxpayers who would have been, or think they have been, compliant for ethical 
reasons could lead to reactance (Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Murphy, 2002) and undermine 
intrinsic ethical motivation (Frey, 1997). Conversely, strong ethical views about paying 
taxes honestly might make deterrence ineffective or superfluous (Paternoster & Simpson, 
1996; Wenzel, 2002b).  
 
Yet, while the interactions between deterrence and ethics/norms may be more complex, 
involving mutually reinforcing as well as inhibiting processes (Wenzel, 2002b), it seems 
clear from the present study that neither the rational actor nor the moral/social actor 
approach has all the answers. Indeed, further progress in the area of tax administration, and 
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regulation more generally, requires that their mutual interplay is better understood and 
conceptualised (James et al., 2001). 
 
The present study has some limitations. First, the standardised regression weights were 
usually (except for auto-correlations) no greater than .10 and, thus, effects were, by 
common conventions, small or very small (see Smithson, 2000). While we should 
therefore be careful not to overclaim any practical significance of the findings, it needs to 
be noted that in the area of taxation even a small percentage increase in compliance can 
mean a substantial gain in tax revenue. Further, because individual tax returns are lodged 
annually, an interval of one year between measurement points was a minimum requirement 
for a cross-lagged panel design. However, empirical relationships between variables could 
decline over such a long time span and, thus, the present findings may underestimate the 
relevant causal relationships between ethics, norms and compliance. Finally, it should be 
noted that the present effect sizes apply to ethics, norms and compliance only as they were 
operationalised in the present study. These concepts are hard to measure, and limitations of 
the measures in terms of reliability and validity also affect the degree of their observed 
relationships, which thus may be underestimated.  
 
Related to this point, however, is a second limitation of the study: all variables were based 
on self-reports and thus may have limited validity. Self-reports can be biased by 
motivations so as to (a) appear logically consistent, (b) comply with norms of social 
desirability or (c), specifically for compliance variables, not incriminate oneself. It needs to 
be emphasised therefore that the present findings hold for self-report data and cannot be 
automatically generalised to behavioural compliance (see Hessing, Elffers, & Weigel, 
1988). Future research could extend the present cross-lagged panel design to actual 
taxpaying behaviour. However, this would require the combination of data from objective 
tax records with survey data on tax ethics and perceived norms – a procedure which would 
pose challenges from the perspective of research ethics. 
 
A third limitation of this study pertains to the cross-lagged panel method itself, which has 
its critics (Rogosa, 1980). For instance, as discussed before, we cannot be absolutely 
certain that all relevant third variables were controlled for and that the observed 
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relationships between ethics/norms and compliance were definitely non-spurious. 
However, this criticism basically applies to all regression methods which, nonetheless, are 
widely accepted in the social sciences. Because all empirical approaches have their 
inherent weaknesses, the present findings should be understood as pieces of empirical 
evidence in a cumulative multi-methodological attempt to shed light on issues of 
compliance and regulation (Wenzel & Taylor, 2003). Bearing this in mind, the present 
evidence indicates that ethics and norms can be both motivations and rationalisations for 
taxpaying behaviour.  
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